The Contradictions of Water Privatization by Hiebert, Andrea
THE. CONTRADICTIONS OF WATER PRIVATIZATION 
Andrea Hiebert 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to understand the issue of water privatization, which is 
presented as a form of foreign aid, that theoretically should benefit all those involved. This includes 
private investors, water companies, the World Bank and of course the poor. However, once these water 
privatization projects take shape, it becomes clear that the only people who emerge with any sort of 
gain are the investors. The purpose of this paper is to understand why this is the case. This will be 
accomplished by first examining how water privatization entered the international scene, ·how it is 
related to international development,and what are the arguments in its favor. Two case studies will 
then be reviewed, so that it will be possible to juxtapose what was supposed to have happened with 
what actually did happen. A postcoloniat and Marxist theoretical framework will be applied to assist in 
the understanding of why these changes occurred and what are their consequences. Our findings 
support the argument that water privatization is not actually helping the poor. In reality; water 
conglomerates are promoting water privatization under the guise of foreign aid in order to establish 
imperial domination over the poor. 
Introduction 
. The topic of water privatization has become increasingly complex and controversial over the 
past couple of decades. There have been numerous publications surrounding this issue, for the purpose 
of reporting what is supposed to be happening in contrast to what is actually happening. It is the main 
goal of this paper to understand whether, why and when water privatization helps to alleviate poverty 
or, in fact, makes things worse for the poor. To that effect, the issue of water privatization will be 
examined through the Marxist and postcolonial theoretical lens. The argument, that this essay will 
make, is that water privatization is being used as a tool by water conglomerates as a way to establish 
imperial rule. These water conglomerates are using' water privatization, under the guise of foreign aid to 
be able to enter developing countries legitimately, where, in a short amount of time they establish 
imperial control. This paper is divided into three parts, the first being concerned strictly with water 
privatization as an issue. It looks at the history of water privatization, how the international community 
came to accept it as a form of foreign aid, and why the World Bank began to promote it. The second 
section looks at two case studies, Argentina and Bolivia. This is done so that one can see the 
contradiction between what the water conglomerates said they were committed to do and what they 
actually did. The third part of the essay examines David Harvey's theory of accumulation by 
dispossession, and Sankaran Krishna's work which ties post-colonialism with globalization. Following the 
explanation of these theories, they will be directly linked to the empirical evidence identified in the case 
studies, so that one can understand why water privatization is not relieving poverty. As indicated earlier, 
it will then become clear as a central argument that there is an underlying factor involved in water 
privatization, which is that the water conglomerates are not actually attempting to provide foreign aid. 
They are pursuing their own agenda of establishing imperial control. However, in order for one to 
understand this, it is necessary to review the history of water privatization. 
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Part One: The History of Water Privatization 
Throughout the past century, the international community has developed a variety of 
conceptions and practices concerning foreign aid. Whether one refers to questions of import-
substitution-industrialization or privatization, international institutions act according to the dominant 
ideas of the time. The dominant trend at present is the privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
Privatization can be defined as lithe transfer of productive public assets from the state to private 
companies" (Harvey 161). To expand further on Harvey's definition, essentially what privatization entails 
is taking what was formerly publicly funded and selling it to a privately owned company, who will then 
take over the industry and collect any profits. This could include any industry, whether it be utilities such 
as gas, electricity, or water, or other government services such as railroads or postal services. However, 
this movement toward privatization came about as a result of a major shift in the development field, 
including the role of the World Bank. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, foreign aid was directed to the 
'repatriation' and 'nationalization' of natural-resource·based sectors (Goldman 787). As further 
explained by Baer and Montes Rojas, "The considerable participation of the state in Latin America is a 
consequence of import-substitution-industrialization (ISI), which was the major development strategy 
from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s. In this context, the state not only encouraged investments, but 
it also participated directly in economic activities" (Baer and Montes-Rojas 323). 
Prior to 1968, the World Bank did not play such a prominent role in the field of development 
assistance. It was not until the McNarnara era, that the World Bank started turning its multi-million 
dollar budget into a multi-billion dollar one (Gold man 788). In order to provide the investment 
necessary for industrial expansion in the South, McNamara proposed a portfolio with both economic 
and political guarantees that would attract the owners of capital in the North to invest in development· 
projects in the South, that had a low level of risk and allowed a high level of control over the projects 
(Goldman 789). This shift in focus is impOrtant because it led to Latin America's debt crisis in the 1980s, 
as the borrowing countries were not able to repay the large loans they were receiving from the North. 
" ... Back in the 1980s, the McNamara era's massive increase in capital loans hit a wall. As Western firms 
and investors profited from this new expansive development regime, borrowing governments could not 
possibly manage the large dollar-based loans with their local-currency-based economies" (Goldman 
789). 
Due to this rising debt crisis, the countries of the North and the international economic 
institutions under their control,' notably the. IMF and the World Bank and their executives, including 
McNamara" devised new lending strategies and conditionality, which imposed on borrowing countries 
many structural adjustment plans that were based heavily on neo-liberal ideas. These neo-liberal ideas 
involved selling off art public enterprises, regardless of whether or not they had been successfully 
producing national wealth, widespread employment, or social stability (Goldman 787). It was becoming 
common belief by the World Bank that privatization was the successful way to alleviate the debt crisis, 
and raise Latin American countries from former levels of poverty. "At the beginning of the 1990s, a 
strong consensus emerged regarding the benefits of privatization. In particular, privatization was 
perceived to promote enterprise efficiency, to reduce fiscal deficits, to increase consumer surplus and to 
create a competitive environment where there was a monopoly structure" (Baer and Montes-Rojas 
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324). Overall, privatization seemed not only to solve Latin America's debt crisis, but to provide a better 
service to consumers, and also incorporate the South into the international market. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Government of the United States of America, the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund endorsed a development model known as the "Washington 
Consensus," which was built on the pillars of market riberalization, fiscal austerity and privatization. The 
Washington Consensus contended that the free market, unimpeded by government interference and 
corruption, could transform underdeveloped economies. (Mulreany et al 24) By the 1990s, this trend 
had spread to even the most essential public-sector services such as education, electricity, transport, 
public health, and water sanitation (Goldman 787). 
How Water Privatization Differs from other Forms of Privatization 
It is important to note the difference in privatizing a commodity such as electricity, telephone 
services, the railway, or gas, versus the privatization of something that is so essential to life such as 
water. The United Nations has indicated the 'special necessity' of water for life in its World Water 
Development Report: 
Water is essential for life. We are all aware of its necessity, for drinking, for producing food, for 
washing - in essence for maintaining our health and dignity. Water is also required for producing many 
industrial products, for generating power, and for moving people and goods - all of which are important 
for the functioning of a modern, developed SOCiety. In addition, water is essential for ensuring the 
integrity and sustainability of the Earth's ecosystems. (United Nations 5) 
This is precisely what sets the privatization of water apart from other privatized commodities. 
First of all, as demonstrated in the World Water Development Report, the world needs water to sustain 
itself. People cannot survive without water, however they can survive without gas or electricity. It is also 
worth pointing out that gas and electricity are clearly defined commodities, whereas water is a life-
sustaining natural resource. This is where the fundamental controversy over water privatization lies. "A 
mighty contest has grown between those (usually powerful) forces and institutions that see water as a 
commodity, to be put on the open market and sold to the highest bidder, and those who see water as a 
public trust, a common heritage of people and nature, and a fundamental human right" (Bartow 18). 
This is also where a clash of cultures can take place. Neo-liberalism, a predominantly Western ideal, 
regards water as a business opportunity. According to this view, it is perfectly appropriate to take 
ownership of water and then sell it back to the surrounding populations. This is actually seen as a viable 
solution to the world wide-water shortage: 
One solution to this crisis [water shortage} is to call in the private sector. The idea is that more 
actors (not just governments) would enter the sector and deliver the services. In an environment of 
relatively free markets, the private sector can deliver not only investments, but also the reforms and 
efficiencies that are urgently needed in water and sanitation service delivery. (Gold man 792) 
The United Nations as a whole, regards water as a commodity as opposed to a right. "Water has 
an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good" (United 
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Nations 18). This is in sharp contrast to the general cultural and religious beliefs that surround water. 
Many different cultures regard water as a gift from God, for everyone to enjoy. Therefore, for someone 
to claim ownership, and then attempt to sell it to anyone is a preposterous notion. In this view, 
privatization is a highly inappropriate method for managing water (Shiva 88-94). Therefore, taking into 
account these two general arguments, it is clear that water privatization differs from the privatization of 
other sectors~ First of all, it is a necessity to life, whereas other state-owned services are not. There is 
also a cultural and religious aspect connected with water that is not present in other sectors. This is why 
water privatization has become a matter of increasing importance and this is precisely why it is the topic 
of this essay. 
Water Privatization as Foreign Aid 
Now that an account of the process of privatization of state owned enterprises has been given 
and the reasons that set water privatization in particular aside from the privatization of other sectors 
have been explained, it is imperative that we discuss the reasons surrounding water privatization as a 
form oHoreign aid. As stated by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, a coalition ~f 
160 transnational corporations, including some of the largest involved in water, energy, and waste 
management: 
Providing water services to the poor presents a business opportunity. New pipes, pumps, 
measurement and monitoring devices, and billing· and record keeping systems wiJI be required to 
modernize and expand water infrastructure .. Industry not directly related to the provision of water 
services will be able to enter new markets because water for production, and to sustain a productive 
workforce, will be available. Thus this program has the possibility of creating huge employment and 
sales opportunities for large and small businesses alike. (Gold man 792) 
As is explained in this quote, the general idea surrounding water privatization in relation to 
foreign aid is that it will be beneficial to both the investors in the North, and the consumers in the South. 
Not only will the water sector as a whole improve, but it will help lift countries out of poverty through 
their incorporation into the global market and through the creation of more jobs. This inclusion will then 
promote the further development of other industries in developing countries, which will over time, in 
turn become more industrialized and more developed. In summary, water privatization is portrayed as 
being a solution to world poverty that can benefit everyone. The water companies earn a profit from 
their customers in the developing country, while the citizens of the developing country have increased 
access to cleaner water. This is in direct relation to the water supply and sanitation targets outlined by 
the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC), "to reduce by one-half the proportion 
of people without sustainable access to adequate quantities of affordable and safe water" (United 
Nations 8). This target can then be related to the Millennium Goal of 'reducing by one half the world's 
people living on less than one dollar a day'. Investment in water infrastructure and services to promote 
regional development is a direct contribution to this goal, (United Nations 9). 
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The World Bank's Promotion of Water Privatization 
As has become evident in the preceding sections, the World Bank and private water companies 
are the primary actors in water privatization. The two subsidiary members of the World Bank, which 
have a direct role in water privatization are the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The IFe's role is to promote the 
growth of private enterprise in developing countries by becoming a shareholder of the enterprise, 
together with other private national and international investors (Karnsand Mingst 364). The ICSID was 
formed to arbitrate investment disputes between foreign investors and governments (Vilas 40). The IFC 
. states "that privatization· can deliver a wide range of material economic benefits is now a view so widely 
held that it scarcely needs elaboration" (Baer and Montes-Rojas 325). This statement is based on the 
following six premises, as outlined by Baer and Montes-Rojas. The first is that privatization provides 
resources for the state's fISCal needs and reduces the fiscal burden of state- owned enterprises. The 
second is that privatization improves efficiency and quality of services in the infrastructure sector. 
Privatization is also supposed to extend coverage and access in the case of public utilities. Next, it is 
supposed to increase domestic stock ownership, and lastly privatization- is supposed to attract foreign 
and domestic investment (Baer and Montes-Rojas 325). In addition, as indicated in Goldman's article, 
water privatization is supposed to create more jobs for the local people (Goldman 792). All in all, these 
premises appear to be in the correct line of thinking for decreasing poverty levels in the developing 
world, and although they are discussed in the context of privatization in general, they can still be 
applied to the privatization of water in particular. To link this directly to water privatization, the private 
water companies take the burden of the state-owned water system away from the state, relieving it of 
the prior fIScal burden and aJlowing it to focus on other issues in the country. Water privatization can 
become more efficient in that its citizens can access it for longer periods of time than previously, and 
the quality of the water should also improve. In short, citizens should receive cleaner water and more of 
it. Private ownership should also provide this water service to more people, thus increasing the access to 
parts of cities that previously did not have connections to the water supply. Water privatization should 
also lead to more citizens being able to purchase shares in the water company and, as the value of the 
stocks of the water company rise, increase their earnings. As the company grows, thanks to more local 
and foreign investment, it will continue to pull the developing country out of poverty. Lastly, water 
privatization should also increase employment opportunities. Therefore, more people will be able to 
work, thus contributing to the local economy, which in turn will create more jobs and thus continue to 
build economic prosperity. Based on these premises, water privatization appears to be an efficient and 
highly appropriate method to relieve poverty in the developing world. But do results meet 
expectations? 
. Part Two: case Studies 
Argentina 
Now that the reasons for water privatization have been outlined, it is appropriate at this point, 
to examine two case studies of water privatization to see how these premises have played out. The two 
case studies to be examined are those of Argentina and Bolivia. Argentina began its privatization regime 
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in the 1990's. In 1993~ Aguas Argentinas SA. (MSA) won the monopolistic concession of Buenos Aires' 
water. The MSAis a multinational consortium, comprised of Suez and Vio'ia, the Argentine group 
Sola tie and other minority shareholders (Vilas 35). The ownership is as following: Suez is the leading 
shareholder at 39.93%; Aguas de Barcelona (which Suez partly owns) at 25.01%; the Program of Shared 
Ownership at 10%; Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires, 8.26%; Violia, 7.55%; the IFC 5% and Anglican 
Water, 4.25% (Vilas 35). The way in which the MSA was able to take possession of Buenos Aire's water 
was through a bidding process. This stipulated that the bidder offering the lowest base rate coupled 
with an investment plan that included improved and expanded services would take ownership (Vilas 35). 
It is also important. to note exactly how the AASA was able to bid so favorably. As Argentina's state-
owned enterprises were slowly being sold off to private companies, the Menem government, in 
anticipation of the privatization. of the water sector began to raise water rates. In February 1991, the 
rates rose by 25%, and two months later, they rose by another 29% (Vilas 35). By April 1992, the rates 
were elevated again by 18%, and then again by 21% shortly thereafter. This was done to make it easier 
for water companies -to be able to make substantial bidding offers (Vilas 35). It was due to this 
considerable increase in water rates that the AASA was able to make a highly acceptable bid and thus 
win the rights to the water industry of Buenos Aires. "In principle, the $4.1 billion investment plan would 
span the 30 years of the concession. The stated objective of privatization was to universalize the 
delivery of quality service by renovating existing, and constructing new, infrastructure" (Vilas 35). In 
other words, the AASA made a promise to provide more readily accessible, safe, clean, drinking water to 
a larger part of the population. 
Referring back to the seven promises outlined earlier, the AASA broke nearly every one of them. 
In terms of reducing the fiscal burden of the water industry on Argentina, the MSA did accomplish this. 
However this was only a short term relief: due to the uprising of angry consumers who were dissatisfied 
with the water quality and rate increases, the Argentine government was forced to take back the burden 
of the water sector (Vilas 4O).'The government was then presented with the fiscal burden of the legal 
action that was brought by the AASA to the ICSID. "The AASA wanted to hold the government 
responsible for the company's losses due to the devaluation and the end of convertibility" (Vilas 40). 
The Second commitment was that water privatization would improve the effICiency and quality 
of the water. Unfortunately this did not happen in Buenos Aires. " ... Several important areas of the 
concession are rife with persistent problems, including with regard to water pressure and 
quality ... "(Vitas 39). In connection with improved efficiency, temporary cuts of water due to preventable 
technical failure were a common occurrence (Vilas 39). This echoes the unfit quality of the water, which 
was reported to have high levels of nitrates (Vilas 39). According to Barlow, "water in seven districts [of 
Buenos Aires} had nitrate levels so high itwas unfrt for human consumption"(Barlow, 20). Therefore this 
commitment was not kept by the MSA. 
The third promise, that water privatization made, was to extend coverage and access to clean 
drinking water. In terms of extending coverage, there is no evidence of the AASA building additional 
pipelines to reach the slums on the outskirts of Buenos Aires .... because the contract stipulates that 
financing for expansions witl come exclusively from rates pald by new users. In societies with high levels 
of income this scenario might work quite well, but it proves dreadfully inadequate in countries like 
Argentina where severe poverty is widespread. Those who lack access to potable water and sewage 
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services are precisely society's poorest, for whom pay is low and unemployment high, making them the 
least able to afford the services. (Vifas 36) 
In addition to not fulfilling the extended coverage aspect of their promise, the MSA also did not 
increase access to potable drinking water. Shortly after taking over the water of Buenos Aires, the AASA 
began to raise numerous rates: the general rate rose by 13.5%, basic connection fees rose by 83.7%, 
sewage by 42%, and other charges increased by anywhere from 38% to 45% (Vilas 36). This resulted in 
many citizens becoming unable to afford their water bills, and thus the AASA cut their access. 
In terms of increasing domestic stock ownership, at first, the MSA seemed to fulfill this. As per 
the terms of the contract, the workers' union, through the program of Shared Ownership, allowed them 
to hold a 10% share of the AASA (Vilas 36); Unfortunately, 'lone immediate effect of privatization was 
the slashing of the workforce by 40%"(Vilas 36). Therefore it is clear that the MSA did not increase 
domestic stock' ownership or employment opportunities. In fact it did the opposite. In terms of 
increasing domestic and foreign investment the AASA did meet this promise halfway. As previously 
indicated, there was a 'large amount of foreign investment in the MSA, however the only domestic 
investrpent is the Banco de Galicia y BUenos Aires at 8.26% and the Program of Shared Ownership with 
its 10% that was greatly reduced through labour cuts. Overall, upon .ooking at the evidence presented 
by this case'study of Buenos Aires, it is clear that the only promise made by privatization that was kept 
was the attraction of foreign investment. 
Bolivia 
The next case study to investigate, is the water privatizationpr,0jects in Bolivia, where, such 
projects took place in three major cities: Cochabamba, la Paz and' El Alto. Aguas del Tunari took 
ownership of Cochabamba's water in 1999, under a 30 year contract (Cohen 16). Aguas del Tunari is a 
consortium comprised of various shareholders. They include: International Water limited of the United 
Kingdom (a partnership between Bechtel of the United States and the Edison spA company of Italy) with 
a 55% stake; the Spanish company Abengoa S.A., with a 25% stake; and four private Bolivian investors 
each with a 5% stake (Mulreany et al 28). la Paz and El Alto were managed by the administration of 
Aguas de lIIimani, a subsidiary of Suez, the World Bank, which he'd an 8% .share, and other .private 
investors (Grant and Shiffler 22). In terms of the promises made by water privatization, these two 
companies, like the MSA, did not follow through. In terms of relieving the state of the fiscal burden of 
the water industry, at first both companies accomplished this. However, as in Argentina, once these two 
companies were removed from Bolivia, they sought monetary compensation through the ICSID. '~Aguas 
del Tunari is seeking as much as US$50 million in compensation for the concession's termination" 
(Mulreany et al 26). This clearly puts more fiscal burden on Bolivia than the previous water sector ever 
did. Next comesthe efficiency and quality of the services. In El Alto~ approximately 200,000 people (out 
of a total population of 800,000) still had no water hook-up. Over the term that Aguas de ltIimani was in 
charge of El Alto's water supply, it failed by 33% to meet the requirements for new connections as 
outlined in its contract (Cohen 17). 
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The following set of issues surround the coverage and access to safe drinking water. like in 
Argentina, Bolivians were faced with rising water rates that they could not afford. In Cochabamba, water 
rates immediately rose threefold to $20 a month. This, taking place in a country where the minimum 
wage is less than $60 a month (Barlow 20). In addition to the rising rates, Aguas lIIimani also charged 
hook up fees of about $450, this being the equivalent to the food budget of a family for two years 
(Barlow 20). Similar issues o'ccurredin El Alto. The price of water increased by 35%, and the connection 
cost for new families exceeded $445. This amount exceeds more than six months income at the level of 
the national minimum wage (Grant and Shiffler 22 ). 
As it is clear from the records ofA$uas de IlIimani and Aguas del Tunari, they have attracted 
large amounts of foreign investment, in essence, from international water companies and the World 
Bank. They have also attracted domestic investors, but on a much smaller scale. But it is doubtful 
whether either company created additional employment. According to Shiva, in fact, water privatization 
generally reduces employment: "Public systems worldwide 'employ five to ten employees per 1,000 
water connections, while private con:tpanies employ two to three employees per 1,000 water 
connections"(Shiva 91). Taking this into account, it is most likely that in Botivia too, as was the case in 
Argentina, employment rates were actually reduced as a result of water privatization. Overall, like in 
Argentina, the only fulfi"ed promise is that of the foreign investment opportunities offered. 
Part Three: THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
The Marxist Theoretical Approach: Accumulation by Dispossession 
Marxism, in relation to international studies, has changed drastically over the past decades. The 
main focus of this examination of the Marxist approach will be on Oavid Harvey's account of 
accumulation by dispossession. Harvey begins by discussing the fact that there are two different aspects 
of the accumulation of capital. The first one is strictly an economical process, involving the capitalist and 
the wage laborer. The other aspect of the accumulation of capital involves the relationship between 
capitalism and non-capitalist modes of production, that are making their way into the international 
arena (Harvey 137). As indicated in The New Imperialist, "its [the relationship between capitalist and 
non-capitalist modes of production] predominant methods are colonial policy, an international loan 
system- a policy of interest - and war. Force, fraud, oppression, looting are openly displayed without any 
attempt at concealment ... " (Harvey 137). What is argued in this chapter, is that in order for capitalism to 
sustain itself, it must rely on non-capitalist societies to stabilize its overaccumulation. Overaccumulation 
occurs because the wage laborer produces more than than he is able to afford to purchase due to his 
poor wage earnings (Harvey 138). This results in a surplus of capital being produced, which must be 
reinvested somewhere so that capitalism can continue to prosper. This is where non-capitalist societies 
come into play, because capitalists can invest in them, and thus reduce their problem of 
overaccumulation. o "As we have seen in the case of the spatio-temporal fixes, the geographical 
expansion of capitalism which underlies a lot of imperialist activity is very helpful to the stabilization of 
the system precisely because it opens up demand for both investment goods and consumer goods 
elsewhere" (Harvey 139). This is precisely how capitalism is inter-connected with imperialism. ,It is just as 
important to have access to cheaper inputs (land, raw materials, intermediate inputs or labour power) 
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as it is to have access to widening markets. This is the case because it keeps profitable opportunities 
open (Harvey 139). Therefore, if necessary, non-capitalist territories should be forced to open up to 
investors who can profit from the cheaper materials, labour, or land (Harvey 139). 
Harvey uses house 'flipping' in the United States as an example of how accumulation by 
dispossession works. The process is as follows: a house in poor condition is bought at a low price, 
renovated, and sold at a much higher price. This is done through a mortgage package arranged by the 
seller, who typically targets low-income families. If this low-income family should have difficulties in 
meeting any sort of payment then the house is repossessed. The fundamental effect of this ordeal is to 
prey on the low-income family and obtaIn whatever small savings they had (Harvey 152-153). This, on a 
basic scale, is exactly what Harvey's accumulation by dispossession theory is. 
Accumulation by dispossession can be applied on the international scale, as a way to solve the 
problem of over-accumulation. 11 What accumulation by dispossession does is to release a set of assets 
at a very low cost. Over-accumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them" to 
profitable use" (Harvey 149). This can be accomplished by capitalists, entering new territories and taking 
at little to no cost either labour, natural resources or manufactured goods, so that their over-
accumulation (as earlier defined as a surplus of capital) can be reinvested, which will result 'in the 
stabilization of their own capitalist system. 
Accumulation by Dispossession and the Rise of Neo-liberalism 
Harvey attributes the rise of neo-liberalism to the work of Margaret Thatcher in the 1970's. As a 
way of attacking the economic problems of Britain at this time, she, along with Reagan, transformed the 
welfare state into an active supporter of the supply side of capital accumulation (Harvey 157). This 
prompted the IMF and the World Bank to change their policy frameworks in favor of those of neo-
liberalism. As this was taking shape, Europe and the rest of the Anglo-American world also began to 
follow suit (Harvey 158). It is this rise of neo-liberalism that enabfed accumulation by dispossession to 
become ever more predominant after thei1970s : 
The primary vehicle for this development was financialization and the orchestration, largely at the 
behest of the United States, of an international financial system that could, from time to time visit 
anything from mild bouts of devaluation and accumulations by dispossession on certain sectors or even 
whole territories ..• For all this to occur required not only financialization and freer trade, but a radically 
different approach to how state power, always a major player in accumulation by dispossession, should 
be deployed. The rise of neo-liberal theory and its associated politics of privatization symbolized much 
of what this shift was about. (Harvey 156) 
Therefore, it is easy to see how accumulation by dispossession at the state level was then transferred to 
the international scene through neo-liberalism. In fact, Harvey also makes the connection that since 
capitalism had been suffering from chronic overaccumulation since the 1970s, then the neo-liberal 
project of privatization, is an excellent way to combat this problem (Harvey 149). Next we will explain 
. how accumulation by dispossession, through neo-liberalism, created this contemporary trend of 
privatization throughout the developing world, and how this is a form of imperialism. 
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The Rise of Privatization and Imperialism 
As the powerful countries and international institutions of the world become more and more 
involved with neo-liberal ideology, a rise in privatiiation takes place all over the world, even in the area 
of global environmental 'commons' .. With new mechanisms of accumulation by dispossession opening 
up, this has led to an increased depletion of global environmental commons (land, air and water). As a 
result, these natural resources are being used as capital investments, for the production of capital 
goods, and this is creating an overall degradation of these environments (Harvey 148). Harvey defines 
these trends as a new wave of the enclosing of the commons. In previous times, the state was able to 
combat these problems by exerting control over its own territory. However, privatization has made it 
significantly harder for states to be able to accomplish this and find internal solutions to their problems, 
including that of capital accumulation . 
. Harvey believes that the inability of countries to find internal solutions to the issue of 
accumulation of capital is particularfy dangerous, because it tends to breed imperialism or at least to 
exasperate the imperialist logic, as countries try to acquire cheap capital elsewhere. In his view, this 
was the case of Britain in the past (Harvey 180). It seems to be the case of the USA today: 
"As occurred in Britain at the end of the preceding century, the blockage of internal reform and 
infrastructural investment by the configuration of class interests during these years has also played a crucial role in 
the conversion of us politics towards a more and more overt embrace of imperialism" (Harvey 180-181). 
Being the present day hegemon, the United States generally employs its power to ensure that 
international institutional arrangements. work for its own benefit (Harvey 181). Harvey makes the 
argument that free trade and open markets are the ways through which monopolized enterprises, which 
are part of advanced capitalist states, are able to dominate trade, production, services and finances 
(Harvey 181). 
The primary vehicle for accumulation by dispossession, therefore,. has been the forcing open of 
markets throughout the world by institutional pressures exercised through the IMF and the WTO, 
backed by the power of the United States (and to a lesser extent Europe) to deny access to its own vast 
market to those countries that refuse to dismantle their protections. (Harvey 181) 
In summary, David Harvey's thesis addresses the general problem of over accumulation in 
capitalist systems. In order to solve this problem, and increase the level of stability in their own capitalist 
system, reinvestment must occur, preferably in countries with low capital intensity. This is how neo-
liberalism became so predominant in the international arena, and how privatization became such a 
widespread trend. It also explains how imperialism has risen as a way for hegemonic powers to maintain 
their dominance in the world. Having reviewed the Marxist theoretical perspective, let us now examine 
the postcolonial theory, so that a fuller understanding of water privatization can be reached. 
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The Postcolonial Theoretical Approach 
Postcolonialism, as an international theory is difficult to define. Different authors focus on 
different aspects of postcolonialism in addition to another theory. For example, feminists tend to focus 
on the. role of women in relation to postcolonialism, whereas cultural studies would focus more on the 
cultural aspects involved in postcolonialism. Taking into account the topic at hand and its inter-
connectedness with the world market and neo-liberalism, Sankaran Krishna's explanations of 
postcolonialism are the best suited to define this theory. Krishna's book focuses on the relationship 
among globalization, nea-liberalism, and postcolonialism. According to the author, "postcolonialism can 
be provisionally defined as the perspective or worldview of those who believe that it is possible to 
understand today's world only by foregrounding the history of colonialism - defined in a very preiiminary 
way as the domination of certain societies 'and peoples by others - over the past five centuries" (Krishna 
3). Included in this history of colonialism is the fact that capitalist development and colonial conquest 
are intimately related. In building on this, postcolonialism contests the neo-liberal claim that the free-
. market produces prosperity for all or improves living conditions (Krishna 4). Postcolonialism also makes 
the argument that both historically and at present, unregulated capitaJist growth has been and still is 
highly unequal thus producing prosperity for a select few and misery forthe remaining majority (Krishna 
4). 
According to Krishna, what sets postcolonialism apart from Marxism is. that, in addition to 
focusing on the world market as a form of domination, it also looks at the fact that the West exerts 
cultural domination over the world = 
An important aspect of postcolonialism is its sensitivity to issues of culturol domination: economicolly-
developed and dominant nations invariably set the standords and constitute the model against which others are 
evaluated or evaluate themselves . . This domination of the West over the world in the realms of knowledge 
production and culture, or Eurocentrism~ is an enduring legacy of coloniafism ... (Krishna 4) 
In summary, it i~ clear that postcolonialism regards neo-liberalism and the wofld market in the 
same way as mat:Xism: a way for the select few rich capitalists to dominate the non-capitalist poor 
majority and to keep them trapped in this. capitalist system. However, postcolonialists also realize that 
imperial rule. is not accomplished by means of the free-market alone . .The West also' uses cultural 
domination in addition to their capitalist rule. They evaluate other cultures by comparing them to their 
own culture, and this is used as their tool for asserting cultural superiority. 
The Connections Between Water Privatization and Postcolonialism and Marxism 
As is evident from the case studies in both Argentina and Bolivia, the results of what happened were no 
accident, they were a deliberately contrived strategy. As indicated in the previous sections, the only 
promise that was fulfilled through water privatization was an increase in foreign direct investment. This 
puts into sharp focus where the priorities of the AASA, Aguas de lIIimani and Aguas del Tunari really lie: 
in making profits. Both case studies illustrate that these three water conglomerates did not make any 
improvements to the water systems in the developing countries. What they actually did was continue to 
maintain the basic operations of the water infrastructure that was already in place while continuously 
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raising rates so that their own profits would increase. In Cochabamba, rates were increased by 200%, to 
allow for Aguas del Tunari to increase its planned profits to $58 million (Barrow and Clarke 17). The 
AASA also hiked rates so astronomically that they went from defICit to a $350 million profit within their 
second year of operation :(Vilas 36). The way that they were able to accomplish this was that they held 
the monopoly over the water industry in each of their cities. "Water systems, which are traditionally run 
as monopolies, are unlike most industries. While there may be competition among providers to acquire 
a water contract, the municipality awards the contract to only one provider" (Mulreany et al 30). 
Therefore, in essence, once these water conglomerates win control over their respective municipality, 
they begin their process of imperial domination. Having the monopoly of the industry gives them the 
security necessary not to have competitive prices. They have complete control over the quantity, the 
quality and the price of the water, and, as was clearly laid out, the prices of this essential service grow to 
the point that it is impossible for the vast majority of the citizens to afford it. As argued in Harvey's book, 
"productive assets include natural resources. Earth, forest, water, air. These are the assets that the state· 
holds in trust for the people it represents .•. To snatch these away and sell them as stock to private 
companies is a process of barbaric dispossession on a scale that has no parallel in history" (Harvey161). 
Therefore, it is clear that the AASA, Aguas de IlIimani and Aguas del Tunari were not providing any form 
of aid to Argentina or Bolivia. They were there to establish imperial control so that they could then 
obtain as high a profit as possible in order to increase their own market share. 
These cases also illustrate the blatant double standard that is present in water privatization 
cases: the fact that governments should be obliged to adhere to the contract pertaining to the 
privatization project while the water conglomerates do not. Eight months into its contract, the AASA 
raised its rates, which was not permitted in its contract (Vilas 36). It also postponed the building of its 
sewage treatment system, which was to be built within the first five years of the concession (Vilas 37). 
However, once the general population became incapable of paying the large rate hikes, and the ETOSS 
forced them to leave before the contract was finished, they sought legal action from the ICS/D. It was 
the company's intention to sue the Argentinian, government for the loss ~f future profits. This is all in 
spite of the fact that the contract had been broken previously by the water conglomerates, as 
mentioned above. 
This double standard also occurred in Bolivia. Aguas de lIIirnani and Aguas del Tunari broke 
similar promises to the AASA. Rates were raised when their respective contracts stipulated that they 
should not be. They also did not invest in infrastructure or wastewater treatment (Barlow 20). With 
rates that rose by more than 200%, $58 million of profit was made from Cochabamba alone (Barlow and 
Clarke 17). Upon being forced to leave, Aguas del Tunari then turned to the ICSID in an attempt to sue 
the Bolivian government for approximately $50 million, as compensation for lost future profits 
(Mulreany et al 28). 
In addition to this double standard surrounding contracts, there was also a double standard in 
terms of the environmental degradation caused by the AASA and the two water conglomerates in 
Bolivia. Due to the fact that the AASA did not fulfill its promise to construct the much needed water 
sewage treatment facilities, over 95% of Buenos Aires' sewage was being dumped directly into the Rio 
de la Plata. This river, as noted by Barlow, had such high levels of pollution already, that it can be seen 
from space (Barlow 20). The AASA did nothing to alleviate this health hazard. There was also a similar 
issue in la Paz. Aguas de IlIimani, instead of building a wastewater treatment system built a series of 
109 
ditches and canals through the poor parts of La Paz, which were used to transport raw sewage and 
garbage from the city into Lake Titicana, which is considered by UNESCO to be a world heritage site 
(Barlow 20). It is also worth mentioning that the Aguas de lItimani company strategically located its 
headquarters under Mount lIIimani. This was done so that in the spring, it would be able to capture the 
snowmelt from the mountain and then reroute it to the homes of those who could afford to pay for it 
(Barlow 20). This in turn cut off the water supply to the nearby slum community Solidaridad. Due to this 
lack of water, the school and clinic that were built with foreign aid money were unable to operate 
(Barlow 20). Therefore, taking into account Ha.rvey's theory of accumulation by dispossession and 
Krishna's explanation of postcoloniafism, it is clear to see that these two theories apply directly to the 
issue of water privatization. Water privatization is quite obviously a· deliberately contrived strategy for 
powerful water companies and international institutions to establish imperial rule over developing 
countries. This is evident through their blatant disregard for the promises they made and the contracts 
they signed. The only achievement these water conglomerates make is to increase their capital gain 
through the exploitation of the citizens in developing countries, and also through the exploitation,of 
their environments. This is a matter involving both capital domination as well as cultural domination, 
which is why both postcolonialism and marxism are vital to understanding'its complexities. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is clear to see that water privatization is a multi-faceted issue filled with false 
assumptions and many broken promises. However, once Marxism and postcolonialism are applied to 
this issue for the purpose of understanding why this occur, it becomes apparent that the large water 
conglomerates are simply establishing imperial rule, under the gOise of foreign aid. This became evident 
once the case studies in Argentina and Bolivia were investigated. It was through this investigation that 
one can see that the only promise kept by the water conglomerates was that of an increase of foreign 
investment. The only members involved who moved ahead were the water conglomerates, and when 
they lost control of the water supply they attempted to obtain financial compensation through the 
ICSID. The case studies enabled the reader to see what was really happening, so that marxism and 
postcolonialism could then be applied to assist in understanding why these contradictions were 
occuring. One of the gaps of this paper is that it does not explain how these water conglomerates, 
legally speaking, were able to get away with their abuses. In terms of future research, it would be 
interesting to also look at water privatization from a legal stand point to complement the understanding 
gained from Marxism and Postcolonialism. This could further expose and highlight the elements of 
corruption and immorality involved in water privatization, as already suggested by Harvey's and 
Krishna's theories. 
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